Post by account_disabled on Jan 31, 2024 8:33:06 GMT
The correspondents Lluçía Oliva and Xavier Sitjá had told us: Gorbachev was unpopular. We didn't get a single favorable opinion. Nor of his predecessors. Total skepticism. But the Western media, for the most part, presented Gorbachev as a hard-working and courageous leader willing to end the Cold War and reform the unreformable. Governments were more cautious. The summits with Reagan improved the climate and led to a thaw in East-West relations , which had been very stiff since the downing of the South Korean civilian plane by the Soviets, the largest American weapons program "in times of peace" and the usual disputes in the global periphery. When Gorbachev realized that his good words and promises were not enough, he began to put a price on the reforms.
Literally. He knew that the country was in ruins and that perestroika would soon become an entelechy if it did not receive Western help. Germany's desire to access what only a few years ago seemed impossible, national Phone Number Database unification, was the great negotiating trump card of the Soviet leader. Kohl pressured Washington to endorse Moscow's financial rescue, knowing that this was the shortest way to promote German reunion, as historian Katherine Spohr tells us. And then, the West's charm withered. Support began to be nuanced and went from praise to cost calculation. If the Soviet leader played marketing, the bidding would have to be raised, in order to reduce the Soviet military apparatus, whose loyalty to the new leader there were serious doubts.
In the Soviet republics, Gorbachev had lost credit and his tug-of-war with the West mattered little. From the Baltic to the Caucasus, separatist options were reinforced. The West had miscalculated Gorbachev's intentions and possibilities. The last Soviet leader was not, could not be, a transformer, but a simple firefighter With the coup attempt of 1991, it became clear that the stability of the USSR was hanging by a thread. But beyond that, many of the exaggerations about the shadowy power of the KGB, the ruthlessness of the Red Army , and the crushing bureaucratic weight of the party were called into question. The bungling was top notch. This Prigozhin operetta connects with that other one.
But the Gorbachev who came from Crimea was already a zombie, despite the relieved Western forecasts, which saw in the failure of the coup a final opportunity for Soviet president. Big mistake.
Literally. He knew that the country was in ruins and that perestroika would soon become an entelechy if it did not receive Western help. Germany's desire to access what only a few years ago seemed impossible, national Phone Number Database unification, was the great negotiating trump card of the Soviet leader. Kohl pressured Washington to endorse Moscow's financial rescue, knowing that this was the shortest way to promote German reunion, as historian Katherine Spohr tells us. And then, the West's charm withered. Support began to be nuanced and went from praise to cost calculation. If the Soviet leader played marketing, the bidding would have to be raised, in order to reduce the Soviet military apparatus, whose loyalty to the new leader there were serious doubts.
In the Soviet republics, Gorbachev had lost credit and his tug-of-war with the West mattered little. From the Baltic to the Caucasus, separatist options were reinforced. The West had miscalculated Gorbachev's intentions and possibilities. The last Soviet leader was not, could not be, a transformer, but a simple firefighter With the coup attempt of 1991, it became clear that the stability of the USSR was hanging by a thread. But beyond that, many of the exaggerations about the shadowy power of the KGB, the ruthlessness of the Red Army , and the crushing bureaucratic weight of the party were called into question. The bungling was top notch. This Prigozhin operetta connects with that other one.
But the Gorbachev who came from Crimea was already a zombie, despite the relieved Western forecasts, which saw in the failure of the coup a final opportunity for Soviet president. Big mistake.